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I. INTRODUCTION
In honour of the 40th Consumer and Commercial Law Workshop
and the 50th volume of the Canadian Business Law Journal we have
been asked to provide a retrospective of developments in the conflict
of laws that highlights emerging issues. We have chosen to present it
in a conversational fashion in which each of us presents a perspective
and the other two offer their comments.
II. THE MORGUARD REORIENTATION
1. Form Follows Function (Blom)
In this look back at the last 40 years, the development I want to
highlight is the way in which the ordering principles of Anglo-
Canadian private international law have changed.1 What used to be
a field with a markedly conceptual structure has become one that, at
least ostensibly, has reoriented itself based on its purposes rather
than its doctrinal apparatus. In the last few decades, a relatively rule-
bound subject has become more of a policy-driven subject.
Of course, there is nothing unique or recent about this transition.
Much of the development of law, especially common law, since the
mid-19th century can be seen in terms of a shift in emphasis from
Respectively of the Schulich School of Law, the Faculty of Law of the University
of British Columbia and Osgoode Hall Law School.
The ordering principles of Quebec private international law were and are largely
embodied in codified rules, although the content of those rules changed
extensively with the coming into effect in 1994 of Book Ten (Private International
Law) of the Civil Code of Quebec, L.R.Q., c. C-1991. The Supreme Court of
Canada decisions discussed here have affected the courts' approach to the
codified rules to some extent but, since the principles are more or less fixed by the
code, the shift in orientation has been less profound than in the common law
jurisdictions of Canada.
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means — that is, doctrine — towards ends.2 But in private
international law, perhaps because of its esoteric aura, the
conceptual foundations tended to be more resistant to erosion
than they were in other parts of the law.3
It was in 1990 that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Mor'guard,4
gave Canadian private international law the decisive push for
change. The power of the decision lay less in what it actually decided,
which was that the grounds for recognizing foreign money
judgments should be enlarged, than in the way the court justified
the change. Two related ideas were emphasized. One was comity.
Although the term "comity" suggests little more than voluntary
deference as between sovereign entities, La Forest J. said it should be
viewed, rather, as a practical necessity. "[I]t is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to inter-
national duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws... "5The
other idea was that private international law is more about enabling
than restricting. Its rules "are grounded in the need in modern times
to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines in a
fair and orderly manner."6
These two ideas have introduced a new dynamic into the law.7 On
the whole, they have encouraged Canadian courts to give more effect
2. Roscoe Pound, who himself was following in Holmes's footsteps, observed more
than a century ago that law "must be valued by the extent to which it meets its
end, not by the beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules
proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundation": "Mechanical Jurispru-
dence" (1908), 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, at p. 605.
3. A notable exception before 1990 was divorce. The concept of domicile used to be
central to determining jurisdiction to grant a divorce and to recognizing foreign
divorces, but the results it produced were so at odds with social attitudes and
conditions that by the mid-1980s it had been entirely sidelined by legislative and
judicial action. Jurisdiction in divorce now depends on ordinary residence, not
domicile (Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 3), and foreign divorce
decrees are recognized by statute on the basis of ordinary residence (Divorce Act,
ibid., at s. 22(1)) and, at common law, on the basis of a real and substantial
connection between either party and the jurisdiction in question (Indyka v.
Indyka, [1969] 1 A.C. 33, [1967] 2 All E.R. 689 (H.L.); see also El Qaoud v. Orabi
(2005), 12 R.F.L. (6th) 296, 2005 NSCA 28).
4. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoys (1990), 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 1077. The impact of the decision was assessed in a symposium in (1993),
22C.B.L.J. l ,pp. 2 to 131.
5. Ibid., at p. 1096 (S.C.R.), p. 269 (D.L.R.), quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895), at pp. 163-164.
6. Ibid., at p. 1096 (S.C.R.), p. 269 (D.L.R.).
7. A third, very important, underlying idea was the link between private
international law and the Canadian constitutional framework. Generally speak-
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to foreign laws and legal decisions, when doing so is seen to promote
interjurisdictional freedom of movement or transactions. At the
same time, courts have had to bear in mind La Forest J.'s
qualification to this general orientation, namely, the "order and
fairness" part of the equation. Its significance is harder to define
because it points in two directions. "Order" highlights the need to
control and the right of a state to do so, whereas "fairness" suggests
the need not to control too much.
How, then, has this new dynamic played out? And have
developments since Morguard been successful in the sense that the
law seems to be working better than it did before?
The most radical changes stemming from Morguard have been in
the area of foreign judgments. The range of judgments that
Canadian courts will recognize and enforce has been dramatically
extended. Take, first, money judgments. Before 1990, a judgment in
an undefended foreign action could be enforced only if the defendant
had previously agreed to accept the foreign court's jurisdiction.
Now, such a default judgment is enforceable as long as the litigation
had a real and substantial connection with the foreign jurisdiction.8
The rule applies both to interprovincial and international cases,9
although interprovincially it is a constitutional obligation on the
province10 whereas internationally it is a matter of common law.
The main beneficiaries of this change are foreigners and fellow
Canadians from other provinces (plaintiffs) who do business with or
otherwise have dealings with persons resident in a Canadian
jurisdiction (defendants). A plaintiff now has a much greater
ability to sue the defendant in the plaintiffs own jurisdiction
because, even if the judgment is in default of appearance, it will be
enforced in the defendant's jurisdiction. This, it can be assumed,
encourages people from other jurisdictions to have dealings with
Canadians and so benefits Canadians and promotes the goals
identified in Morguard.
At the same time, there is a price to be paid for this liberalization
and it falls mainly on Canadian defendants. The "real and
substantial connection" test is elastic, indeed it was meant to be
so. Commenting on the use of the test in the jurisdictional (as distinct
ing, however, this has given Canadian private international law not so much a
new impetus as a new set of constraints.
8. Morguard, supra, footnote 4.
9. Beats v. Saldanha (2003), 234 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 2003 sec 72.
10. Hunt v. T&Nplc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 at p. 324, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 16 at pp. 40-41.
See Elizabeth Edinger, "The Constitutionalization of the Conflict of Laws"
(1995), 25 C.B.L.J. 38.
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from the foreign judgment) context, La Forest J. said in Hunt that
"the assumption of, and the discretion not to exercise jurisdiction
must ultimately be guided by the requirements of order and fairness
not a mechanical counting of contacts or connections."11 Canadian
defendants who are sued elsewhere must therefore always assume
that they are exposed to the risk of any money judgment being
enforceable against their assets at home, except in the very few cases
where the circumstances do not meet even the furthest stretch of the
test.12 This situation is manageable as between two Canadian
jurisdictions,13 but obliging Canadian defendants to defend virtually
any action brought against them in the United States or other
foreign countries is proving onerous, especially given the narrowness
of the defences to enforcement that the common law provides.14
The other potentially far-reaching change, again resulting from
the dynamic set up by Morguard, is the ability to enforce non-
monetary orders, which previously could not be enforced at all even
if they were made in defended proceedings. In the Pro Swing case,15
the Supreme Court lifted the bar to enforcing non-monetary orders
but, by a majority, refused enforcement in the particular case and
defined only in the most general terms the circumstances under
11. Hunt, ibid., at p. 326 (S.C.R.), p. 42 (D.L.R.).
12. Very few decisions show a foreign judgment being refused recognition because
there was no real and substantial connection with the originating jurisdiction.
One of the few is Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46
(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 182 D.L.R. (4th) vi, commented on
by Vaughan Black and Michael Deturbide, "Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk:
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction for Internet Torts" (2000), 33 C.B.LJ. 427.
13. As is implicit in the uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees
Act, promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1997, online:
Uniform Law Conference of Canada <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?-
sec= l&sub = Ie4>, which in s. 6(3)(a) eliminates any defence that the original
court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. The Act, or an earlier version of it
without the non-monetary order provisions, has been adopted in seven provinces
and Yukon: see the table online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada <http://
www.ulcc.ca/en/us/Table_3_En.pdf> (The table omits the Enforcement of
Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act, S.N.S. 2001, c. 30.)
14. See Reals, supra, footnote 9; Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Services
Inc., [1999] 4 W.W.R. 573, 83 A.C.W.S. (3d) 374 (B.C.C.A.); Jacob S. Ziegel,
"Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada, Unlevel Playing Fields, and
Beals v. Saldanha: A Consumer Perspective" (2003), 38 C.B.LJ. 294; Stephen
G.A. Pitel, "Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Where Morguard Stands After
Beals" (2004), 40 C.B.LJ. 189; Joy Goodman and Jeffrey A. Talpis, "Beals v.
Saldanha and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada" (2004), 40
C.B.LJ. 227.
15. Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, 273 D.L.R. (4th) 663, 2006
sec 52. See Vaughan Black, "Enforcement of Foreign Non-Money Judgments:
Pro Swing v. Elta" (2006), 42 C.B.LJ. 81 (commenting on the Ontario Court of
Appeal decision).
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which enforcement should be granted. The court regarded the
question essentially as one of exercising an equitable (in the equity
vs. law sense) discretion.16 It is open to question how much value, in
terms of promoting cross-border activity, is offered by introducing
the possibility of enforcement when its exercise is so uncertain.'7 The
new rule will, however, advance cross-border justice to the extent
that Canadians who are the subject of foreign injunctions or orders
to account for profits18 can no longer count on taking shelter from
these orders behind the border.19
Compared to foreign judgments, the impact of the M or guard
dynamic on jurisdiction, though far-reaching in analytical terms, has
been modest in practical terms. It has narrowed, rather than
broadened, the ability of the courts to take jurisdiction. The service
ex juris rules in most provinces were extremely liberal already. There
are some cases in which Canadian courts would previously have said
they did have jurisdiction, based on the service ex juris rules, but they
now say that they do not, based on the lack of a real and substantial
connection, which Morguard introduced as a constitutional limit on
the provinces' judicial jurisdiction.20 Because the real and
substantial connection test is driven, as La Forest J. said, by
considerations of order and fairness,21 it has proved easier to define
as an adjudicative process than as a concept.2 The notion of comity
makes its own addition to the mix by inviting the consideration of
16. See especially Pro Swing Inc, ibid., at para. 31.
17. The parameters for the enforcement of non-monetary orders are somewhat
clearer under s. 6 of the Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act,
supra, footnote 13.
18. Including those from other provinces. This is governed by statute in the provinces
that have enacted the uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees
Act, ibid.
19. This will be particularly significant in an area like intellectual property, where
such orders are often the primary remedy. The orders in Pro Swing related to an
Ontario online seller's ceasing infringement of a U.S. trade-mark and accounting
for profits.
20. Morguard, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1109 (S.C.R.), p. 278 (D.L.R.); Hunt, supra,
footnote 10, at p. 324 (S.C.R.), pp. 40-41 (D.L.R.); Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 1022 at p. 1049, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289 at p. 304. The two grounds for
service ex juris that most frequently have been held to fail the real and substantial
connection test are that damage was sustained in the province or that the non-
resident defendant was a necessary or proper party to an action against a resident
defendant. See Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd. (2010), 316 D.L.R. (4th) 201,
2010 ONCA 84, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted July 8, 2010, Court File No.
33692.
21. See above, text accompanying footnote 11.
22. See the elaborate analysis in Van Breda, supra, footnote 20, which modified the
earlier, equally elaborate one in Muscutt v. Courcelles (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th)
577, 60 O.R. (3d) 20 (C.A.), supp. reasons 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661.
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larger questions relating to the relationship between legal systems.23
The real and substantial connection criterion is said to be the
same, whether one is determining the limits on a Canadian court's
own jurisdiction or deciding whether a foreign court had jurisdiction
for purposes of recognizing its judgment.24 This conceals, however,
an unresolved asymmetry between the two uses of the test, because
the reach of the real and substantial connection test is tempered in
the jurisdictional context by the doctrine of forum non conveniens,25
whereas in the foreign judgment context it is not.26
As for choice of law, in the one recent case to come before the
Supreme Court, the effect of Morguard was, paradoxically, to shift
the law to a doctrinally more rigid position than before.27 Unlike in
the other areas, the need for order was seen as trumping the need for
flexibility.28
The "purposive" reorientation initiated by Morguard therefore
presents a mixed picture. It has certainly made the law conceptually
less hidebound in the areas of foreign judgments and jurisdiction,
although the same cannot be said, yet, of choice of law. The ability of
non-Canadians to sue Canadians in the plaintiffs own jurisdiction
has been greatly enhanced, whereas, for Canadians suing foreigners,
access to the plaintiffs home court has, in some respects, been
reduced. Mixed, too, is the picture as between benefits and costs. The
23. As in the issue of how parallel proceedings should be handled in forum non
conveniens cases: see Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, [2009] 1
S.C.R. 321, 303 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 2009 sec 11. See also (on the B.C. Court of
Appeal decision) Vaughan Black and John Swan, "Concurrent Judicial Jurisdic-
tion: A Race to the Court House or to Judgment? Lloyd's Underwriters v.
Cominco Ltd" (2008), 46 C.B.L.J. 292; and the symposium on the case (2009), 47
C.B.L.J. 165, at pp. 166-224.
24. Morguard, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1103 (S.C.R.), p. 274 (D.L.R.); Van Breda,
supra, footnote 20, at para. 103.
25. The idea that forum non conveniens is an "important counterweight" to the rules
of jurisdiction simpliciter was relied upon in Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American
Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 54, 2002 sec 78, at
para. 57.
26. This asymmetry underlies LeBel J.'s urging (in dissent, but not on this point) that
a "context-sensitive jurisdiction test ought to take into account the difficulty of
defending in a foreign jurisdiction," in Beats, supra, footnote 9, at para. 171. See
also Pitel, supra, footnote 14, at pp. 207-208.
27. Tolofson, supra, footnote 20.
28. "[OJrder comes first. Order is a precondition to justice." Tolofson, ibid., at p. 1058
(S.C.R.), p. 311 (D.L.R.), per La Forest J. The primacy of order was also linked
to the court's tentative view that the constitution may implicitly require uniform
choice of law solutions throughout the provinces; see ibid., at pp. 1065-1066
(S.C.R.), pp. 316-317 (D.L.R.). A prescient discussion of the constitutionaliza-
tion of choice of law rules is J. Swan, "Perspectives of a Conflicts Lawyer" (1983),
7 C.B.L.J. 410, at pp. 416-419.
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reorientation of the law on foreign judgments and jurisdiction has
been bought at the price of greater uncertainty, stemming from the
inherently malleable real and substantial connection test. Overall,
however, even after two decades, the balance between concepts and
goals is still evolving and it is probably still too early to say for sure
whether or not the changes are a success. And, in any case, a full
assessment would require looking at how the law has changed
elsewhere as well as here.
2. Conflicts of Law as a Trade Issue (Black)
It is undeniable that judicial reasoning in the field of Canadian
private international law has been characterized by a shift to a
justificatory approach dominated by instrumental reasoning. Joost
Blom is also right in pointing out that the conflicts field is not unique
in showing marks of such a change in style. With the adoption of a
purposive approach to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms29 and a law and economics orientation to tort law,30 it
would be surprising if judicial argumentation in private
international cases did not betray signs of a similar swing to
policy-driven argumentation — though Blom is right again in
pointing out that this area resisted that trend longer than most
others did.
What I emphasize by way of addition to this observation is a
particular purpose that has become the darling of private
international law thinking in the Supreme Court of Canada — the
promotion of free trade. The Supreme Court's reasoning in conflicts
cases can be called a mode of economic analysis of law, but it is
hardly the Posnerian transactional analysis that has characterized
some of its judgments in torts.31 Rather, it is the embracing of a
single over-riding economic goal: "[T]he need in modern times to
facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines .. ,"32
That phrase has been quoted approvingly in scores of judgments
since Morguard. Its effect has been most pronounced in disputes
dealing with foreign judgments. In both Seals v. Saldanha and Pro-
Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., Morguard?, flow-of-wealth mantra was
29. The genesis of the purpose approach is Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R.
145 at p. 156, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641.
30. Many examples could be offered here, such as Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No.
36 v. Bird Construction Co., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
31. In addition to Winnipeg Condominium Corp., ibid., see the judgment of La Forest
J. in Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1
S.C.R. 1021, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 289.
32. Morguard, supra, footnote 4.
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quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada.33 Its effect
in both cases was that doctrines that stood in the way of enforcement
of foreign judgments were stigmatized as protectionist, with all of
the negative baggage that accompanies that term.
The arrival of policy-responsive reasoning in the realm of
Canadian private international law is to be celebrated. However,
even setting aside concerns we might have about the institutional
capacity of courts to pursue a free trade agenda, the one-dimensional
nature of the values they have espoused give cause for concern. Free
trade may on balance be a good thing, but that is far from
uncontested. Morgucirtfs words were uttered in the wake of the
Mulroney victory in the free trade election, but it is worth recalling a
majority of Canadians voted for parties that opposed the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Morguard's decision that private law
should be reconfigured as a handmaiden to the elimination of
international barriers to free trade may have been welcome to elite
opinion, but its failure to give a nod to values that, at least in some
cases, operate to justify international trade restrictions has been less
helpful. When free trade arrangements are implemented by treaties
there are sometimes areas — labour, culture, the environment,
consumer protection, public morals — where other concerns are
recognized and where limits to market activity can be set. M or guard
showed little awareness of any such countervailing forces. To take
one example, Jacob Ziegel's analysis of Beds v. Saldanha in this
journal emphasized the way in which, at its core, that was really a
consumer protection case.34 Had Morguard acknowledged that
consumer protection concerns can sometimes operate to justify laws
that have the effect of creating limits to free trade, the result in Beals
might have been different. At the very least, its reasoning would
more comprehensively have dealt with the difficult value choices
that the internationalization of market activity presents.
3. Purposiveness and Idealism (Walker)
I agree entirely with Joost Blom that the past four decades35 in
private international law have witnessed a fundamental
33. Beals, supra, footnote 9, at paras. 21 and 26; Pro Swing, supra, footnote 15, at
paras. 7 and 78.
34. Ziegel, supra, footnote 14.
35. And particularly the last two decades, following the decision in Morguard, supra,
footnote 4, the impact of which was analyzed in detail in volume 22 of the
C.B.L.J., supra, footnote 4: J. Ziegel, "Introduction" (1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 1, at p.
2; V. Black, "The Other Side of Morguard: New Limits on Judicial Jurisdiction"
(1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 4; E. Edinger, "Morguard v. De Savoye: Subsequent
2011 ] Current Issues in Conflict of Laws 507
reconsideration of the way in which we approach conflict of laws
rules.36 Some might say that such a reconsideration naturally tends
to give the impression that the law has "reoriented itself based on its
purposes rather than its doctrinal apparatus." Fundamental
reconsideration of a subject tends to prompt a return to first
principles and this often involves the rejection of rules that were
established in other places and times in favour of rules that are
explained in terms of their responsiveness to current needs and
aspirations. In this way, the jurisprudence seems more purposive.
But Blom is right to suggest that there is more to it than this.
Vaughan Black has noted the general shift in judicial reasoning, and
Blom has pointed out that the new purposiveness is a mixed picture.
The greater flexibility afforded plaintiffs through greater
opportunities to obtain judgments enforceable in Canada in courts
other than those of the defendant's residence is to be contrasted with
a reduced flexibility in choice of law rules. This is designed to ensure
that order is not sacrificed for the sake of fairness.37
I agree also that, despite the emphasis on practical justice, the
most radical of the changes to the law brought about by the
reorientation has not necessarily had the effects intended. It is
difficult to imagine that the liberalization of rules for the recognition
and enforcement of judgments was intended to create a situation in
which persons with assets in Canada would be required to respond to
all notices of foreign proceedings, even in places with which they
have little connection and in courts to which they have not agreed,
simply because there was some connection38 between the matter
and the forum. But the enforceability in Canada of foreign default
Developments" (1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 29; P. Finkle and C. Labrecque, "Low-Cost
Legal Remedies and Market Efficiency: Looking Beyond Morguard" (1993), 22
C.B.L.J. 58; J. Wood, "Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Between
Provinces: The Constitutional Dimensions of Morguard Investments Ltd." (1993),
22 C.B.L.J. 104.
36. So much so that when 1 began teaching private international law in the part-time
LL.M. program at Osgoode Professional Development in the late 1990s, I would
survey the incoming class to find out: (a) who had taken a course on the subject in
law school; and (b) who had taken the course as a subject in law school in the
previous decade — on the premise that in either case, so much had changed that it
would necessary to "begin at the beginning."
37. See above, supra, footnote 28; Interestingly, this trend has not been confined to
the Supreme Court of Canada. In Wong v. Lee (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 398, 211
D.L.R. (4th) 69 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal for Ontario opted to return to a
more restrictive interpretation of the flexibility permitted in the Supreme Court
decision in Tolofson, supra, footnote 20, on the question of choice of law in tort
than it had taken in Hanlan v. Serneskv (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 479, 78 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 484 (C.A.), affg 35 O.R. (3d) 603, 73 A.C.W.S. (3d) 936 (Gen. Div.).
38. Although the standard for the necessary connection is a "real and substantial"
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judgments against non-local defendants who have not consented to
the forum has not, so far, been moderated to address the concerns
arising from judgments markedly different from those that could
be anticipated in default proceedings in Canada.39 Under these
circumstances, it would seem that no claim, regardless how small
or frivolous, can safely be left to go undefended, even in a
jurisdiction where a meritorious defence seems likely to fail or the
costs of a successful defence are unrecoverable. The, as yet, largely
unexplored extension of this generosity to foreign non-monetary
judgments40 exacerbates the concerns it creates.
One can only imagine that the liberalization of the rules for
recognizing foreign judgments is the product of a vision of
international judicial relations under the auspices of comity in
which all civil justice systems closely resemble our own, or, at least,
that they must be treated that way. I will consider further, in the third
part of this article, the extent to which this might be idealism or a
vestige of the previous formalism that has yet to be revisited.
III. CONVERGENCE: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERPROVINCIAL
1. What's so Great about Uniformity? (Black)
As with many other aspects of Canadian private international
law, much changed in the realm of judicial jurisdiction with
Morguard.4[ That case established a constitutional constraint on
the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by the provinces' courts.
Such assertions must be fair and orderly.
That seems simple enough. Two decades later, however, key
questions about this new limit remain unanswered. Currently the
most high-profile of these relates to the standard judges must employ
to gauge the values of order and fairness: the real and substantial
connection test. Many courts have wrestled with this, most
prominently the Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt.42 While
connection, this has been interpreted in many provinces as a relatively low
threshold that is then adjusted by the court's discretion to decline jurisdiction on
grounds of forum non conveniens. However, the exercise of discretion to decline or
to refuse to decline jurisdiction is not reviewable at the enforcement stage (see
Canada Post Corp. v. Lepine, [2009] I S.C.R. 549, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 539 sub nom.
Societe canadienne des pastes v. Lepine). Accordingly, a connection that would
not be regarded as sufficient to exercise jurisdiction by a Canadian court could,
nevertheless, be sufficient for a judgment that would be enforceable in Canada.
39. Beals, supra, footnote 9.
40. See supra, footnotes 15-19 and accompanying text.
41. Supra, footnote 4.
42. Muscutt, supra, footnote 22.
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influential, that decision was not universally welcomed,43 prompting
a revisiting and retuning of the Muscutt test in 2010.44 While some of
the battles over the substantial connection criterion may seem like
mere academic skirmishes, there are real differences among the
provinces with respect to what exercises of adjudicatory jurisdiction
are permitted under this yardstick. The most prominent of these is
"touristic jurisdiction." Some provinces — Ontario and Nova
Scotia, for instance — think that their residents can visit or work in
another land, get tortiously injured there, return home to convalesce
and then sue the tortfeasor in the province of their convalescence.45
Some other provinces think this goes too far. British Columbia and
Newfoundland and Labrador apply the real and substantial
connection test in such a matter as to afford defendants protection
against such exercises of judicial power.46
While the Supreme Court of Canada is now poised to sort this
out,47 this is ultimately just a matter of line drawing. I focus here on
more fundamental features that have come to characterize thinking
about the territorial jurisdiction of Canada's courts. The shift to a
consequentialist orientation has already been noted. Within this
orientation I observe two other features. The first is an increased
attention by judges and legislators to the way jurisdiction is exercised
by courts around the world. Canada is participating in a developing
international consensus about those standards. The second is the
homogenization of jurisdictional practice within Canada.
Uniformity is emerging as an explicit desideratum, and the
variation that is permitted by provincial authority over the
administration of justice is coming to be regarded as pernicious.
Before exploring those themes I bring on stage one other
development in the field of court jurisdiction — a statute. The
Uniform Law Conference of Canada has long been active in the
43. See in particular the criticisms J. Blom and E. Edinger, "The Chimera of the Real
and Substantial Connection Test" (2005), 38 U.B.C.L. Rev. 373, and T.
Monestier, "A 'Real and Substantial' Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada"
(2007), 33 Queen's LJ. 179, and Stanway v. Wyeth Canada Inc. (2009), 314
D.L.R. (4th) 618, 2009 BCCA 592, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 317 D.L.R.
(4th) vii, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 68.
44. Van Breda, supra, footnote 20.
45. Ibid.', Muscutt, supra, footnote 22; Penny (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bouch
(2009), 310 D.L.R. (4th) 433, 2009 NSCA 80, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 314
D.L.R. (4th) vi, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 379.
46. Roed v. Scheffler, 2009 BCSC 731, 178 A.C.W.S. (3d) 783; Broman v. Machida
Mack Shewchuk Meagher LLP, 2010 BCSC 760, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 702; Fewer v.
Ellis, 2010 NLTD 35, 295 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 32.
47. I refer to its July 2010 decision to entertain appeal in Van Breda, supra,
footnote 20.
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enforcement of foreign judgments. That continued after Morguard,
with the promulgation of uniform legislation dealing with
recognition of judgments both within Canada and from foreign
countries.48 But Morguard also prompted something new from the
ULCC: the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA), a
model statute dealing comprehensively with the territorial
jurisdiction of the provinces' courts.49 CJPTA, in force in three
provinces and on its way in others,50 is largely a consolidation and
restatement of standards long found in the common law and rules of
court, as conditioned by Morguard?, substantial connection test. In
that respect the divide between those provinces that have adopted
CJPTA and those that retain their jurisdictional law in rules of practice
and the common law is not especially sharp, and generalizations can
still be made about the jurisdiction of the common law provinces.
However, CJPTA also brought some innovations. The most
important of these was the abandonment of tag jurisdiction —
jurisdiction based solely on service on the defendant while present
within the territory of the court.51 Although such an exercise of
judicial power was acknowledged as legitimate in Morguard,52 there
is an emerging consensus around the world that jurisdiction based
on this and nothing more is unfair. What is needed, if jurisdiction is
to be based on a connection between the court and the defendant, is
some stronger affiliation between defendant and forum — namely
residence, which is what CJPTA has adopted.53
Elimination of tag jurisdiction is not the only respect in which
CJPTA demonstrates influence by developments beyond Canada's
borders. As the Supreme Court of British Columbia noted earlier
this year in Josephson v. Balfour Recreation Commission, CJPTA'S new
forum of necessity provision "was drawn from article 3 of the Swiss
Federal Code on Private International Law."54 In addition, the
whole of Part 3 of CJPTA, which establishes a system for
transferring ongoing litigation between provinces, is based
closely on a model act promulgated by the ULCC'S American
48. See supra, footnote 13.
49. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual
Meeting (Ottawa, Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1994), at p. 140.
50. Saskatchewan (S.S. 1997, c. C-41.1), British Columbia (S.B.C. 2003, c. 28) and
Nova Scotia (S.N.S. 2003 (2nd Sess.), c. 2).
51. As in Doyle v. Doyle (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 143, 6 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 110 (Nfld.
S.C.).
52. Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 1103-1104 (S.C.R.).
53. CJPTA, supra, footnote 49, at s. 3(d).
54. Josephson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Sal four Recreation Commission, 2010 BCSC
603, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 695, at para. 86.
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counterpart, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Legislation. Attention to the international scene is
not confined to CJPTA. It is found in the Muscutt test for giving
content to the real and substantial connection test, and was
expressly preserved in Muscutfs 2010 reformulation in Van Breda.
There the court insisted that, in assessing the propriety of an
Ontario court's assertion of jurisdiction in a given case, it would be
"helpful to know how foreign courts treat like cases."55
The second emerging feature of both legislative and judicial
thinking about court jurisdiction is that differences among the
provinces should be eliminated, or at least minimized. Perhaps the
clearest statement of this is the commentary to CJPTA, which lists a
primary goal of that statute as being "to replace the widely different
jurisdictional rules currently used in Canadian courts with a uniform
set of standards for determining jurisdiction.. ."56 The commentary
goes on to offer one, and just one, reason why uniform rules on court
jurisdiction is a desideratum: it is an "essential complement"57 to the
compulsory intra-Canadian enforcement of judgments that emerges
from Morguard.
The striving for uniformity is not limited to CJPTA. In Van Breda
the Court of Appeal for Ontario modified the law of that province
with the express goal of bringing "Ontario law into line with the
emerging national consensus on appropriate jurisdictional
standards."58 It adopted the concept of the forum of necessity
found in s. 6 of CJPTA and art. 3136 of the Quebec Civil Code and it
borrowed CJPTA'S notion of category-based presumptions of
legitimate jurisdiction. The principal justification offered for this
was that "it would bring Ontario into line with one of the central
features of CJPTA."59
There is no space here for extended commentary on these trends,
but a couple of questions may be raised. The first relates to the
unilateral nature of Canada's participation in the developing
international harmony on jurisdiction. While there is no doubt
that such a consensus is forming, both in academic writing and
multilateral conventions, what distinguishes its implementation here
is that those provinces that have brought CJPTA into force have
55. Van Breda, supra, footnote 20, at para. 107.
56. CJPTA, supra, footnote 49, Commentary, at p. 141. For extended argument in
favour of uniformity see J. Walker, "Must there be Uniform Standards for
Jurisdiction within a Federation?" (2003), 119 Law Q. Rev. 567.
57. Ibid.
58. Van Breda, supra, footnote 20, at para. 69.
59. Ibid., at para. 74.
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unilaterally abjured a long-standing basis of jurisdiction. When the
United Kingdom dropped tag jurisdiction by entering the Brussels
regime it received a quid pro quo: other European Union countries
eliminated their exorbitant bases of court jurisdiction against U.K.
residents. That is, in Europe the new consensus about jurisdiction
was implemented by way of a mutually agreed upon restraints. With
CJPTA there was no comparable trade-off— apart, that is, from such
satisfaction that Canadians may gain from knowing that by
eliminating tag jurisdiction they are pursuing a fairer, more
internationally-approved approach to the proper limits of
adjudicatory power.
As far as uniformity goes, the obvious question is, what about the
countervailing virtues of federal variety which would allow for
expression of regional differences? It is obvious that the substantial
connection test, as a constitutional standard, should be applied
uniformly across the country. But that test is simply a limit. The
value of uniformity within that limit is another matter, neither
constitutionally compelled nor obviously beneficial. Morguard
forged a link between its lowered barriers to enforcement of
Canadian judgments and its new check on jurisdiction. If the
provinces were to be compelled to recognize one another's
judgments then there had to be constraints on the power that gave
rise to those judgments. But that does not mandate uniformity of
jurisdictional practice among the provinces. This can be seen from a
glance at the American model expressly referred to in Morguard.
There the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution
mandates free flow of sister-state judgments.60 As a corollary, the
due process clause constrains jurisdiction.61 Crucially, however, the
due process clause has never been interpreted so as to require all the
states to adopt identical rules of court jurisdiction. Within the limit
set by that standard American states exercise a variety of long-arm
rules.
This could be so in Canada, but CJPTA'S claim that uniformity is
"essential" is gaining wide currency. Decisions like Van Breda,
without any articulation of the supposed harms that might flow
from provincial variety of jurisdictional practice, have pursued
uniformity as a proclaimed goal. Modifying judge-made law to
conform to another jurisdiction's statute, as the Van Breda court did,
seems commendable if the statute can be shown to be a good thing.
60. Morguard, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 1098 and 1102 (S.C.R.), pp. 270 and 273
(D.L.R.).
61. Ibid., at pp. 1109-1110 (S.C.R.). pp. 278-279 (D.L.R.).
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Doing so only in the name of interprovincial uniformity is something
else again.
2. Consistency if Necessary but not Necessarily
Consistency (Walker)
Like Vaughan Black, I too would say that one of the most
significant developments in the last few decades has been the interest
in harmonizing jurisdictional standards with other countries and
within Canada. I would also agree that harmonization ought not to
be treated as a desideratum that gives rise to the need to change rules
for the sake of uniformity without regard to the implications of the
proposed changes.
However, I am less troubled by the interest in harmonization than
Black seems to be. There may be benefits to the potential for
innovation, both within a federation and across legal systems, and
this will necessarily create inconsistencies in the law of jurisdiction.
Sometimes, those innovations, such as forum of necessity
jurisdiction, will come to be embraced by other jurisdictions.
However, it is also the case that when comparative analysis reveals a
jurisdictional basis to be an outlier, it may be good to reconsider its
role in supporting the needs of the legal system. The fact that it is
anomalous may signal the need for reconsideration.62
For example, in the case of presence-based jurisdiction, a robust
doctrine of forum non conveniens had already all but eliminated its
practical scope in the extreme cases of tag jurisdiction.63 As a result,
its formal elimination in the jurisprudence seemed likely to come
only by way of obiter comments, as it did in the Supreme Court's
decision in Beats.64
In replacing presence with residence as the standard for
jurisdiction in the defendant's forum, it remains to be clarified
whether residence is intended to refer to a single place, or whether it
62. Whether "uniformity" among Canadian provinces should follow the approach
taken in U.S. federalism, with its margin of appreciation pursuant to the "due
process" standards (under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)), or the seemingly more strictly enforced harmonization pursuant to the
recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (e.g., Owusu v. Jackson
(2005), Case C-128/01), is a larger question for Canadian federalism than could
be addressed here: J. Walker, "The Constitution of Canada and the Conflict of
Laws" (D. Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001) [unpublished],
63. Jurisdiction based on transient presence (Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein,
[1972] 2 Q.B. 283, [1972] 2 All E.R. 689 (C.A.)) is described in the American
jurisprudence as "tag jurisdiction" (Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495
U.S. 604 (1990)).
64. Supra, footnote 9, at paras. 32 and 37.
514 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 50
could include several places. This will be particularly significant for
corporate defendants, especially in view of the historical inclusion of
the term of "carrying on business" in many of the rules for service
out, and its importation into the CJPTA, the scope of which has been
questioned.65 If courts regard the fact that a defendant does some
business in the forum as sufficient to support jurisdiction even where
the claim has arisen elsewhere, this will result in a significant
expansion of judicial jurisdiction — an expansion that would be at
odds with prevailing international standards.66
Picking up on Black's astute observation that "touristic"
jurisdiction has become a prominent example of divergence in the
law from one part of Canada to another, I would add that I am less
confident that it marks a genuine divergence in local policies in
various regions so much as it represents an area of persistent debate
and uncertainty. An area of similarly persistent debate has been that
of interprovincial medical malpractice claims in which the concern
to provide access to justice for those whose financial and physical
health prevent them from traveling to pursue their claims is pitted
against the disruption to the practices of doctors who, as a result,
might have to travel to defend against such claims.67 Where such
65. Williams v. TST Porter, 2008 BCSC 1315, 87 B.C.L.R. (4th) 179; Purple Echo
Productions, Inc. v. KCTS Television, 2006 BCSC 1653, 61 B.C.L.R. (4th) 166, revd
on other grounds 165 A.C.W.S. (3d) 456, 2008 BCCA 85.
66. Paul Dubinsky, "The Reach of Doing Business Jurisdiction and Transacting
Business Jurisdiction Over Non-U.S. Individuals and Entities" (New York,
New York Law School, 1998), online: United States State Department
< www.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/dubinsky.html >.
67. See, e.g., Josephson, supra, footnote 54; Kahlon v. Cheecham, [2010] O.J. No.
1584, 2010 ONSC 1957; Evans (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canil, [2009] O.J. No.
3600, 82 C.P.C. (6th) 216 (S.C.J.); Penny, supra, footnote 45; Bartz v. Canadian
Baptist Bible College Inc., [2009] N.S.J. No. 163, 2009 NSSC 115; O'Connor v.
Chapman, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2986, 2007 BCSC 657; Mueller v. Resort Investors
International, ULC, [2006] O.J. No. 4952, 153 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1093 (S.C.J.); Miller
v. Harding, [2006] O.J. No. 3412, 150 A.C.W.S. (3d) 816 (S.C.J.); Sampson v.
Olsen, [2005] S.J. No. 751, 2005 SKQB 501; Deakin v. Canadian Hockey
Enterprises, [2005] O.J. No. 705, 7 C.P.C. (6th) 295 (S.C.J.); Georges v. Basilique
de Sainte-Anne-de-Beaupre, [2004] O.J. No. 3762, 7 C.P.C. (6th) 205 (S.C.J.);
Mar/candu (Litigation Guardian of) v. Benaroch (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 377, 242
D.L.R. (4th) 101 (C.A.); Armstrong v. Servier Canada Inc., [2002] B.C.J. No.
1939, 2002 BCSC 1248; Leu/kens v. Alba Tours International Inc., [2002] O.J. No.
2129, 213 D.L.R. (4th) 614 (C.A.), supp. reasons 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661; Lemmex
v. Bernard, [2002] O.J. No. 2131, 213 D.L.R. (4th) 627 (C.A.); Sinclair v. Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., [2002] O.J. No. 2127, 213 D.L.R. (4th) 643, supp.
reasons 213 D.L.R. (4th) 661 (C.A.); Muscutt, supra, footnote 22; O'Brien v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2002] N.S.J. No. 57, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 668, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused 217 D.L.R. (4th) vi, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 155 McNichol
Estate v. Woldnik, [2000] O.J. No. 5027, 52 O.R. (3d) 49 (S.C.J.), affd 13 C.P.C.
(5th) 61, 108 A.C.W.S. (3d) 274 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] 2
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jurisdictional questions resist resolution even through the most
skilful handling in the jurisprudence, it may be wondered whether
answers might better be sought in context-specific doctrines or
legislation than in the continued refinement of common law rules of
general application.
3. Why Jurisdiction Simpliciter Matters (Blom)
I agree with Vaughan Black's argument that securing uniformity
of jurisdictional rules among the provinces and territories is not of
itself a crucial goal. And, for the foreseeable future, it will not be
achieved from sea to sea, because the rules for territorial competence
in the Civil Code of Quebec68 are quite different from those in the
other provinces, and the role of forum non conveniens, as enshrined in
the Code,69 may be somewhat different, too.70
Although the rules of jurisdiction simpliciter consume a lot of
judicial and scholarly ink, it is worth asking how significant they
really are. In cases where the defendant disputes jurisdiction it
hardly matters in practical terms what the rules are, because the
S.C.R. viii; Bulloch-Macintosh v. Browne, [1998] O.J. No. 5684, 84 A.C.W.S. (3d)
674 (Gen. Div.); Oakley v. Barry, [1998] N.S.J. No. 122, 158 D.L.R. (4th) 679
(C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 175 N.S.R. (2d) 400n, 233 N.R. 397n;
Dennis v. Salvation Army Grace General Hospital, [1997] N.S.J. No. 19, 156
N.S.R. (2d) 372 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 163 N.S.R. (2d) 79», 223
N.R. 77«; Hunt v. Durdle, [1996] N.S.J. No. 327, 153 N.S.R. (2d) 223 (S.C.);
Quaia v. Sweet, [1995] A.J. No. 576, 30 Alta. L.R. (3d) 365 (Q.B.); MacDonald v.
Lasnier, [1994] O.J. No. 2923, 21 O.R. (3d) 177 (Gen. Div.); Kelly v. K Marl
Canada Ltd., [1994] B.C.J. No. 1098, 47 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1195 (S.C.); Monahan
(Guardian ad Litem of) v. Trahan, [1992] N.S.J. No. 456, 36 A.C.W.S. (3d) 767
(S.C.T.D.); Clark v. Naqvi, [1989] N.B.J. No. 1003, 63 D.L.R. (4th) 361 (C.A.);
Robinson v. Warren, [1982] N.S.J. No. 34, 55 N.S.R. (2d) 147 (S.C.A.D.).
68. Supra, footnote 1, at arts. 3134 to 3151.
69. Ibid., at art. 3135.
70. Ibid., at art. 3135, which refers to the "exceptional" character of the discretion
and this word was emphasized by the court in Spar Aerospace Ltd., supra,
footnote 25, at para. 77. Although the court saw this character reflected in case
law from common law jurisdictions, notably Amchem Products Inc. v. British
Columbia ( Workers' Compensation Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 102 D.L.R. (4th)
96, the practice of the common law courts in the last couple of decades has not
reflected a view that declining jurisdiction is "exceptional." There may, however,
be straws in the wind of a trend in that direction; see Young v. Tyco International
of Canada Ltd. (2008), 300 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 2008 ONCA 709, at para. 28 ("the
standard to displace the plaintiffs chosen jurisdiction is high," per Laskin J.A.);
Purple Echo Productions, Inc. v. KCTS Television, 2008 BCCA 85, 76 B.C.L.R. (4th)
21, at para. 59 ("the prima facie entitlement of [the plaintiff] to its chosen forum,"
per Chiasson J.A.). Compare Olney v. Rainville, 2009 BCCA 380, 95 B.C.L.R. (4th)
118, at para. 42.
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forum non conveniens discretion is ultimately the deciding factor.71
Nevertheless, the content of the rules is important. In cases in which
the defendant does not appear, the substantive jurisdiction
simpliciter rules and the associated procedural rules control the
plaintiffs access to a default judgment. If courts grant default
judgments against non-resident defendants on too thin bases of
jurisdiction, the result may be out of keeping with standards of
justice generally accepted elsewhere. Canadian courts will be seen as
overreaching. If the judgment debtor has assets in the originating
Canadian jurisdiction they will be exposed to seizure on inadequate
grounds.
Then there is the question of the judgment creditor's ability to
enforce the judgment elsewhere. Within Canada, in the provinces
that have enacted the uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments
and Decrees Act, the judgment is enforceable without the
defendant's having any right to raise the original court's lack of
jurisdiction.72 Even elsewhere in Canada it will be difficult to
challenge the originating court's jurisdiction. If the rules of the
originating court for jurisdiction simpliciter satisfy minimum
constitutional requirements, a court in another province has no
choice but to recognize it since the minimum standard of jurisdiction
for recognition purposes is the same. As for courts in other nations,
the fact that they may choose not to recognize the judgment is more
than just a problem for the judgment creditor; it also has broader
implications for the reputation of the Canadian legal system in the
courts of other countries.73
One potentially important development is the gradual emergence
of a distinction between the regular rules of jurisdiction and the
exceptional possibility of a "forum of necessity" that can also
support jurisdiction simpliciter. The latter concept, as Black notes
above, is found in the Civil Code of Quebec,74 the CJPTA,75 and now,
if this aspect of Van Breda76 stands, in the common law (and,
71. In Spar Aerospace Ltd., supra, footnote 25, at para. 57, the court portrayed art.
3135, the forum non conveniens discretion, as an integral part of the means by
which the jurisdictional rules in the Civil Code of Quebec ensure that the real and
substantial connection is satisfied.
72. Supra, footnote 13.
73. "I reject the surprisingly insular argument made by some scholars that we should
ignore foreign law when considering and applying the real and substantial
connection test": Van Breda, supra, footnote 20, at para. 107, per Sharpe J.A.
74. Supra, footnote 1, at art. 3136.
75. CJPTA, supra, footnote 49, at s. 6.
76. Supra, footnote 20, at para. 100.
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presumably, constitutional law)77 of jurisdiction. If this distinction
develops further, we may see further moves to streamline78 the
regular rules for jurisdiction simpliciter for the sake of cutting down
the scope for jurisdictional contests, even at the price of not
occupying every nook and cranny of the available constitutional
room. The forum of necessity would become the means of dealing
with the marginal but nevertheless compelling cases.
IV. BECOMING MORE WORLDLY IN A CHANGING WORLD
1. The Subject Matter has Changed, but Has the Subject. . .
and Have We? (Walker)
To round out this trilogy of reflections on the most significant
developments and trends over the past four decades, I will highlight
the changing nature of the cross-border disputes in which conflict of
laws issues arise as a significant agent for change in the subject. And
to the extent that the world in which the conflict of laws operates has
evolved, I will ask whether our evolving approach to the subject has
kept pace with it.
It has been my impression that the conflict of laws is a world that
was once dominated by family law matters and more generally by
questions of choice of law and it is now concerned more with a fuller
range of private law matters, one that more closely reflects the
spectrum of disputes in local cases, and more generally with
questions of jurisdiction and judgments. To determine whether
this is more than mere conjecture, I decided to compare the leading
casebooks on the subject. There may be little scientific validity in a
study based on comparing casebooks, but this is the way that the
subject is presented to students and to non-specialists, and,
accordingly, it is one reflection of the way in which we understand
it. I compared the leading Canadian casebook in 1970 (a work
published in 1968),79 with the leading Canadian casebook in 2010.80
77. The constitutional viability of the "forum of necessity" concept is untested, but
the emphasis in the leading Supreme Court cases on "order and fairness" as the
dominant considerations in jurisdiction simpliciter (see above, text accompanying
footnote 11) suggests that it has a reasonable chance of surviving the test.
78. The CJPTA, supra, footnote 49, at s. 10, presumptions of a real and substantial
connection, which were taken up in Van Breda, supra, footnote 20, at paras. 72 to
80, can be seen as an initial streamlining.
79. J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws: Cases, Notes and Materials, 2nd ed.
(Toronto, Butterworths, 1968).
80. Nicholas Rafferty, et al., eds., Private International Law in Common Law Canada:
Cases, Text, and Materials, 3rd ed. (Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2010).
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Interestingly, the books were of similar length — 1096 pages in
1968 and 1066 in 2010,81 but the contents were quite different. In
1968 family law subjects occupied 278 pages out of 619 pages
concerning the special rules applicable to the various areas of private
law. This compared with the situation in 2010 in which family law
subjects occupied 148 pages out of 439 concerning the various areas
of private law. In other words, by this measure, family law once
occupied 45% of the space devoted to the various areas of private
law and it now occupies only 34%. The focus on family law among
the areas of private law is considerably less than it once was.
The impression concerning the overall extent of attention paid to
the particular areas of private law compared with the other subjects
combined was also borne out. In terms of the pages occupied by
each, the ratio has gone from 619-477 pages or 56-44% in 1968 in
favour of areas of private law to 439-627 pages or 41-59% in 2010. If
pages were votes in an election, we might say that the particular areas
of private law in the subject as a whole had gone from a majority to a
minority position.
Conversely, the increase in the space allotted to jurisdiction and
judgments was also significant. The 149 pages devoted to these
subjects in 1968 grew to 314 pages in 2010. In other words, where
only 14% of the subject as a whole was once concerned with
jurisdiction and judgments, the portion of the subject as a whole has
since increased to 29%.
But it is the direct comparison between the relative allocations of
pages to the two subjects that is the most striking. By 2010, the 278
pages allotted to family law in comparison with the 149 pages
allotted to jurisdiction and judgments in 1968 had become 148 pages
for family law in comparison with the 439 pages for jurisdiction and
judgments in 2010. Not only has the strong emphasis shifted from
one to the other, but also the differential between them has
increased, despite the slight reduction in the overall page-length of
the book. What was once a little more than twice as much space
devoted to family law has become three times as much devoted to
jurisdiction and judgments.
Has this shift in the kinds of cases and issues addressed, possibly
reflecting a changing world in which the conflict of laws operates,
changed the conflict of laws itself? Could it help to explain some of
the observations made by Blom and Black? And could it help to
explain other impressions of the ways in which the subject has
81. This page count excludes the preliminary material and the index.
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evolved and might evolve in the years ahead. I think the answer to
these questions is "Yes."
In the case of Blom's observations that doctrine-driven,
formalistic analysis had given way to more purposive, or
functional and pragmatic analysis, there may be an explanation in
the case law in which these approaches have been developed. The
rights and obligations of parties to family law disputes were once
subject to rather formalistic analyses (in tension with public policy
interventions) even in local cases; and family law disputes often
arose from decisions made without regard to their potential legal
consequences. For example, one would not expect a conflict of laws
issue arising from a couple's decision to relocate to another country
or to seek a divorce in a place other than the place in which they were
married to have been anticipated and to have been the subject of
deliberate choices in the way that one might hope would be the case
for a large international business relationship — even if the impact of
the outcome on the parties in both cases was significant. An
approach to conflict of laws analysis that was based on a wider range
of cases might tend to reflect less a tension between formalistic
reasoning and equitable exceptions and more a legal framework
intended to foster purposive decisions in respect of the cross-border
issues that might arise.
And, in the case of convergence, as discussed by Black, to the
extent that the case law on which the doctrine is developed reflects a
reduced proportion of cases giving rise to areas of significant local
policy related to diverse cultural norms, the rules may naturally tend
to converge. Moreover, the interest in promoting convergence to
facilitate cross-border dealings may also be more evident.
But what does it mean to say that this changing world could create
the need to become more worldly? Many things, but the short space
remaining permits me to mention only two. First, as consumers and
small businesses increasingly enter into the global marketplace for
goods and services, the challenge of adapting the perspective of the
conflict of laws to deal with the participation of this new sector of the
economy will require a host of changes. Rules made with
sophisticated parties in mind, parties who benefit from legal
advice and representation tailored to the particular transaction or
relationship, may need to give way, or to be supplemented by rules
that serve the needs of those with less sophistication and those who
are less likely to benefit from such resources. Rules that take party
autonomy for granted may need to be refashioned into rules that
encourage party autonomy but otherwise support the reasonable
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expectations of persons who have not negotiated specialized terms
for their dealings. And, perhaps even greater challenges will be posed
by the blurring of distinction between the two groups — consumers
and commercial parties (e.g., Is a person who buys a basic computer
online for a home office a consumer or a business?).82 And still
greater challenges will be posed by the irresistible force/immovable
object clash between the imperatives of inconsistent international
obligations, such as those of the New York Convention,83 and
mandatory laws, such as those based on the European Council
Directive on Commercial Agents,84 that are designed to protect
consumers and small businesses.85
Second, becoming more worldly will mean recognizing that not
all judicial systems are like our own. In countries like Canada that
have high regard for their civil justice system and for their
willingness to eschew parochialism, it is difficult to imagine
allowing for differences in other legal systems without engaging in
criticism of them. In procedural matters, it is difficult to imagine
allowing for hardships and injustices that could occur by reason of
the cross-border nature of a matter even if the legal system on each
side of the border is internally beyond reproach. And yet the failure
to do so could give rise to a range of difficulties for defendants
required to travel to defend against any and all claims regardless of
the size or merit lest they be enforceable judgments of amounts
unmitigated by their participation in the proceeding.86 In
substantive matters, it is difficult to imagine permitting important
local policies to supersede those that would otherwise apply by
reason of ordinary choice of law principles. And yet the failure to do
so means either compromising such policies, or cloaking their
vindication in the less than candid characterization of the matter as
one of "procedure."87
82. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 801, 284
D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2007 sec 34.
83. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
[1986] Can T.S. No. 43, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, adopted June 10, 1958 in New York.
84. Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (EU Council Directive
86/653/EEC).
85. Accentuate Ltd. v. Asigra, [2009] EWHC 2655, [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 599 (Q.B.).
86. J. Walker, "Striking the Comity Balance Anew" (2002), 5 Can. Intl. Law. 28.
87. Such as characterizing limitation periods as a matter of procedure: "Courts should
apply local procedural law. Limitations law is based on a foundation of legal
philosophy and concepts of fairness. Applying the limitations law of Alberta
ensures the application of a just limitations system in accordance with accepted
Alberta principles because the Alberta law reflects what Alberta believes is the
fairest balance between the conflicting interests of claimants and defendants."
Alberta Law Reform Institute, Limitations, Report No. 55 (Edmonton, The
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The Supreme Court of Canada has shown valour in discretion by
tailoring its reasons on at least two occasions recently to avoid
sweeping rulings that might have unnecessarily broad implications
and unintended consequences.88 On both occasions, the foreign legal
systems in which differences from our own might have prompted
such caution were among those with which we have the greatest
familiarity — legal systems in the United States. Perhaps one
measure of worldliness that might guide our evolving understanding
of comity in the years ahead is appreciating that, in dealings with
good neighbours, not only that there are bases for agreement, but
also for principled differences.
2. What's Up, What's Down in Conflicts (Blom)
Janet Walker is quite right to point to the fact that Canadian
private international law has changed in vital ways due to shifts in
the kind of interjurisdictional legal issues that are litigated. Teaching
the subject today, I spend far more time on jurisdiction and foreign
judgments than I did when I started teaching the subject in 1972, and
far less time on choice of law. This is partly because Morguarcf9 and
subsequent Supreme Court of Canada cases have created a whole
new law of jurisdiction and foreign judgments, as discussed in
Vaughan Black's and my portions of this paper. But it is also because
choice of law has shrunk in importance. Family law, as Walker
notes, features far less in the cases, and this is especially true of the
choice of law side. This is partly because, in the last 40 years,
Canadian domestic law has been liberalized both in the law of
marriage90 and divorce,91 and the rules for recognizing foreign
divorces, which used to be an enormous problem, has now been
eased by statute92 to the point where very few recognition cases are
taken to court.
Also important in the changing landscape is the greater role of
international conventions. What used to be particularly
troublesome areas have been addressed by internationally
coordinated law reform. The problem of how to deal with custody
fights, when children have been brought into or kept in the province
Institute, 1989), p. 98, discussed in Castillo v. Castillo (2005), 260 D.L.R. (4th)
439, 2005 sec 83.
88. Pro Swing Inc., supra, footnote 15; Teck Cominco, supra, footnote 23.
89. Supra, footnote 4.
90. The prohibited degrees are now confined to siblings, half-siblings, and persons
who are lineally related: Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, S.C. 1990, c. 46.
91. Divorce Act, supra, footnote 3.
92. /hid., at s. 22.
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to avoid the jurisdiction of another country's court, has been greatly
reduced in scope by the beneficial effect of the Hague Convention on
Child Abduction.93 In commercial areas, too, international
conventions or regimes cover much more ground than they used
to. Judicial co-operation in cross-border insolvencies, for example,
has now been strengthened and facilitated by amendments to
Canadian bankruptcy law94 that are based on an UNCITRAL Model
Law.95 International conventions now provide uniform rules for
litigation arising out of contracts of international carriage of
passengers and goods by sea96 and by air.97 Although it has
resulted from convergence rather than from agreement, personal
property security legislation has become much more uniform across
Canada and as between Canada and the United States.
Now and then, any conflicts teacher gets a twinge of apprehension
that the entire subject may be obsolescent. A vision rises before his or
her eyes of inter-jurisdictional problems all getting worked out as
domestic legal regimes become more similar, remaining differences
are smoothed out by internationally agreed rules, and courts become
more adept at handling the few cases that still need to be brought
before them. Happily, however, for those who love the subject, this
vision is still far from being realized. As Walker notes, the regulatory
state and new kinds of cross-border activity continue to throw up
new challenges. To name just one instance, the novel phenomenon of
competing class actions with overlapping multi-jurisdictional
classes, which the Supreme Court of Canada has notably
highlighted,98 has opened up a whole new frontier to be explored.
3. Our American Friends (Black)
It is clear that alterations in the types of cases that tend to get
litigated can alter the configuration of fields of law. In addition to
the shift pointed out by Janet Walker, a striking feature of important
93. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (1980),
1983] Can. T.S. No. 35, 1343 U.N.T.S. 22514, which is law in every Canadian
jurisdiction; see, e.g., Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.I2, s. 46.
Quebec passed an Act paralleling the convention while extending its rules to
interprovincial cases: An Act respecting the civil aspects of international and
interprovincial child abduction, R.S.Q., c. A-23.01.
94. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as am., Part XIII (added in
1997 and 2005).
95. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), online: UNCITRAL
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf>.
96. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6.
97. Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, as am.
98. Canada Post, supra, footnote 38, at paras. 56-57.
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cases in the conflicts over the past decade is not just that they involve
a change from wholly intra-Canadian matters to international
transactions, but that they involve a particular foreign country — the
United States of America. The significant cases on enforcement of
foreign-country judgments — Beats," Pro Swing100 and those at the
provincial appellate level101 — all involve the United States. The
same can be said for our leading decisions on co-ordinating
international litigation, Amchem102 and Teck Cominco.103
Considering the level of Canada-U.S. interaction, this is to be
expected. Still, given that all of Canada big international conflicts
cases seem to involve just one of the world's 200 countries — one
which has a justice system that in many respects differs from those
found elsewhere — it is worth pausing to speculate on how that
situation may have distorted Canadian private international law.
Of course judge-made doctrine in this area does not draw
distinctions depending on which foreign country we may be dealing
with. We do not have one rule for enforcing American judgments
and another for enforcing judgments from other countries; our
choice-of-law rules may vary according to whether an intra-
Canadian or international case is under consideration, but in the
latter instance they do not alter according to which foreign country is
involved. However, as the following words from a recent Ontario
judgment reveal, courts in conflicts cases are not unaware of the
special status of the United States.
Canada is a country closely tied to the United States in many ways. The U.S.
is our closest neighbour and one of our largest trading partners. The flow of
trade, commerce and people across our borders is immense and much has
been done to facilitate this important relationship.104
What is striking about this passage is not just its alignment with the
role of private international law as a facilitator of international trade
— that has become standard practice — but the singling out of the
United States as unique.
99. Supra, footnote 9.
100. Supra, footnote 15.
101. Old North State Brewing Co., supra, footnote 14; United States of America v. Ivey
(1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 370, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 570 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused [1997] 2 S.C.R. x, 145 D.L.R. (4th) vii; Braintech, Inc., supra, footnote 12;
Carrie v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 321, 250
D.L.R. (4th) 224 (C.A.); United States of America v. Yemec (2010), 320 D.L.R.
(4th) 96, 2010 ONCA 414.
102. Supra, footnote 70.
103. Supra, footnote 23.
104. Molson Coors Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 331, 152
A.C.W.S. (3d) 418 (S.C.J.), Lederman J.
524 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 50
Canada puts considerable resources into organizations devoted
to private international law, the chief two being The Hague
Conference on Private International Law and UNCITRAL. These
have yielded some results, yet it is in the nature of multilateral
negotiations that things move slowly. Our sole bilateral treaty in
this field, a judgment enforcement treaty with the United
Kingdom,105 is a little-used anachronism. It should, however,
remind us of the role that bilateral arrangements can play. There
was nothing in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement dealing
with private international law. The matter has been left to judges,
and as Teck Cominco and Curriei06 demonstrate, crafting
Canadian conflict-of-laws doctrine to respond to the particular
problems generated by the U.S. justice system can strain the
institutional capacity of courts. It might be better if the non-
judicial branches of Canadian government attended to these
peculiar problems, leaving the courts with the job of sorting out
the more traditional cases that arise from our interaction with the
rest of the world.
105. The Canada-United Kingdom Civil and Commercial Judgments Convention Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-30, enacts this nationally, and it is implemented as well in
provincial legislation.
106. Supra, footnotes 23 and 101 respectively.
